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Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 54)Since the turn of the century, legislation in Western countries has ex-
panded rapidly to reverse the brief dominance of laissez faire during the
nineteenth century. The state no longer merely protects against viola-
tions of person and property through murder, rape, or burglary but also
restricts "discrimination" against certain minorities, collusive business
arrangements, "jaywalking," travel, the materials used in construction,
and thousands of other activities. The activities restricted not only are
numerous but also range widely, affecting persons in very different pur-
suits and of diverse social backgrounds, education levels, ages, races, etc.
Moreover, the likelihood that an offender will be discovered and con-
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1. INTRODUCTION2 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT:AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
victed and the nature and extent of punishments differ greatly from person
to person and activity to activity. Yet, in spite of such diversity, some
common properties are shared by practically all legislation, and these
properties form the subject matter of this essay.
in the first place, obedience to law is not taken for granted, and
public and private resources are generally spent in order both to prevent
offenses and to apprehend offenders. In the second place, conviction is not
generally considered sufficient punishment in itself; additional and some-
times severe punishments are meted out to those convicted. What deter-
mines the amount and type of resources and punishments used to enforce
a piece of legislation? In particular, why does enforcement differ so
greatly among different kinds of legislation?
The main purpose of this essay is to answer normative versions of
these questions, namely, how many resources and how much punish-
ment shouldbeused to enforce different kinds of legislation? Put
equivalently, although more strangely, how many offenses shouldbeper-
mitted and how many offenders shouldgounpunished? The method used
formulates a measure of the social loss from offenses and finds those ex-
penditures of resources and punishments that minimize this loss. The
general criterion of social loss is shown to incorporate as special cases,
valid under special assumptions, the criteria of vengeance, deterrence,
compensation, andrehabilitationthathistorically have figuredso
prominently in practice and criminological literature.
The optimal amount of enforcement is shown to depend on, among
other things, the cost of catching and convicting offenders, the nature of
punishments—for example, whether they are fines or prison terms—and
the responses of offenders to changes in enforcement. The discussion,
therefore, inevitably enters into issues in penology and theories of
criminal behavior. A second, although because of lack of space subsidiary,
aim of this essay is to see what insights into these questions are provided
by our "economic" approach. It is suggested, for example, that a useful
theory of criminal behavior can dispense with special theories of anomie,
psychological inadequacies, or inheritance of special traits and simply
extend the economist's usual analysis of choice.
II. BASIC ANALYSIS
A. THE COST OF CRIME
Although the word "crime" is used in the title to minimize terminologi-
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Crimes against persons 815
Crimes against property 3,932
Illegal goods and services 8,075
Some other crimes 2,036
Total 14,858
Public expenditures on police, prosecution,and courts 3,178
Corrections 1,034
Some private costs of combating crime I ,9 10
Overall total 20,980
SouRcE.—President's Commission (1967d, p. 44).
all violations, not just felonies —likemurder, robbery, and assault, which
receive so much newspaper coverage—but also tax evasion, the so-called
white-collar crimes, and traffic and other violations. Looked at this
broadly, "crime" is an economically important activity or "industry,"
notwithstanding the almost total neglect by economists.1 Some relevant
evidence recently put together by the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice (the "Crime Commission") is
reproduced in Table 1. Public expenditures in 1965 at the federal, state,
and local levels on police, criminal courts and counsel, and "corrections"
amounted to over $4 billion, while private outlays on burglar alarms,
guards, counsel, and some other forms of protection were about $2 bi!-
lion. Unquestionably, public and especially private expenditures are
significantly understated, since expenditures by many public agencies in
the course of enforcing particular pieces of legislation, such as state fair-
I. This neglect probably resulted from an attitude that illegal activity is too immoral to
merit any systematic scientific attention. The influence of moral attitudes on a scientific
analysis is seen most clearly in a discussion by Alfred Marshall. After arguing that even fair
gambling is an "economic blunder" because of diminishing marginal utility, he says, "It is
true that this loss of probable happiness need not be greater than the pleasure derived from
the excitement of gambling, and wearethen thrown back upon the induction [sic]that
pleasures of gambling are in Bentham's phrase 'impure'; since experience shows that they
are likely to engender a restless, feverish character, unsuited for steady work as well as
for the higher and more solid pleasures of life" (Marshall, 1961, Note X, Mathematical
Appendix).4 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
employment laws,2 are not included, and a myriad of private precautions
against crime, ranging from suburban living to taxis, are also excluded.
Table Ialso lists the Crime Commission's estimates of the direct
costs of various crimes. The gross income from expenditures on various
kinds of illegal consumption, including narcotics, prostitution, and mainly
gambling, amounted to over $8 billion. The value of crimes against prop-
erty, including fraud, vandalism, and theft, amounted to almost $4 bil-
lion,3 while about $3 billion worth resulted from the loss of earnings
due to homicide, assault, or other crimes. All the costs listed in the table
total about $21 billion, which is almost 4 per cent of reported national
income in 1965. If the sizable omissions were included, the percentage
might be considerably higher.
Crime has probably become more important during the last forty
years. The Crime Commission presents no evidence on trends in costs
but does present evidence suggesting that the number of major felonies
per capita has grown since the early thirties (President's Commission,
1967a, pp. 22—3 1). Moreover, with the large growth of tax and other
legislation, tax evasion and other kinds of white-collar crime have pre-
sumably grown much more rapidly than felonies. One piece of indirect
evidence on the growth of crime is the large increase in the amount of cur-
rency in circulation since 1929. For sixty years prior to that date, the
ratio of currency either to all money or to consumer expenditures had de-
clined very substantially. Since then, in spite of further urbanization and
income growth and the spread of credit cards and other kinds of credit,4
both ratios have increased sizably.3 This reversal can be explained by an
unusual increase in illegal activity, since currency has obvious advantages
2. Expenditures by the thirteen states with such legislation in 1959 totaled almost $2
million (see Landes, 1966).
3. Superficially, frauds, thefts, etc., do not involve true social costs but are simply
transfers, with the loss to victims being compensated by equal gains to criminals. While
these are transfers, their market value is, nevertheless, a first approximation to the direct
social cost. If the theft or fraud industry is "competitive," the sum of the value of the
criminals' time input—including the time of "fences" and prospective time in prison—plus
the value of capital input, compensation for risk, etc., would approximately equal the
market value of the loss to victims. Consequently, aside from the input of intermediate
products, losses can be taken as a measure of the value of the labor and capital input into
these crimes, which are true social costs.
4. For an analysis of the secular decline to 1929 that stresses urbanization and the
growth in incomes, see Cagan (1965, chap. iv).
5. In 1965, the ratio of currency outstanding to consumer expenditures was 0.08, com-
pared to only 0.05 in 1929. In 1965, currency outstanding per family was a whopping $738.
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over checks in illegal transactions (the opposite is true for legal transac-
tions) because no record of a transaction remains.6
B. THE MODEL
It is useful in determining how to combat crime in an optimal fashion to
develop a model to incorporate the behavioral relations behind the costs
listed in Table 1. These can be divided into five categories: the relations
between (1) the number of crimes, called "offenses" in this essay, and the
cost of offenses, (2) the number of offenses and the punishments meted
out, (3) the number of offenses, arrests, and convictions and the public ex-
penditures on police and courts, (4) the number of convictions and the
costs of imprisonments or other kinds of punishments, and (5) the number
of offenses and the private expenditures on protection and apprehension.
The first four are discussed in turn, while the fifth is postponed until a
later section.
1. DAMAGES
Usually a belief that other members of society are harmed is the motiva-
tion behind outlawing or otherwise restricting an activity. The amount




where H, is the harm from the ith activity and 0, is the activity level.7 The
concept of harm and the function relating its amount to the activity level
are familiar to economists from their many discussions of activities caus-
ing external diseconomies. From this perspective, criminal activities are
an important subset of the class of activities that cause diseconomies,
with the level of criminal activities measured by the number of offenses.
The social value of the gain to offenders presumably also tends to in-
6.Cagan (1965, chap. iv) attributes much of the increase in currency holdings between
1929 and 1960 to increased tax evasion from the increase in tax rates.
7. The ith subscript will be suppressed whenever it is to be understood that only one
activity is being discussed.6 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH





The net cost or damage to society is simply the difference between the
harm and gain and can be written as
D(O) =H(0)—G(0). (3)
If, as seems plausible, offenders usually eventually receive diminish-
ing marginal gains and cause increasing marginal harm from additional
offenses, G" < 0, H" > 0, and
— 0, (4)
which is an important condition used later in the analysis of optimality
positions (see, for example, the Mathematical Appendix). Since both H'
and G' > 0, the sign of D' depends on their relative magnitudes. It fol-
lows from (4), however, that
D'(O) > 0 for all 0>if D'(Oa)0. (5)
Until Section V the discussion is restricted to the region where D' > 0,
the region providing the strongest justification for outlawing an activity.
In that section the general problem of external diseconomies is recon-
sidered from our viewpoint, and there D' < 0 is also permitted.
The top part of Table 1 lists costs of various crimes, which have been
interpreted by us as estimates of the value of resources used up in these
crimes. These values are important components of, but are not identical
to, the net damages to society. For example, the cost of murder is
measured by the loss in earnings of victims and excludes, among other
things, the value placed by society on life itself; the cost of gambling
excludes both the utility to those gambling and the "external" disutility to
some clergy and others; the cost of "transfers" like burglary and em-
bezzlement excludes social attitudes toward forced wealth redistribu-
tions and also the effects on capital accumulation of the possibility of
theft. Consequently, the $1 5 billion estimate for the cost of crime in
Table 1 may be a significant understatement of the net damages to society,
not only because the costs of many white-collar crimes are omitted, but
also because much of the damage is omitted even for the crimes covered.
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The more that is spent on policemen, court personnel, and specialized
equipment, the easier it is to discover offenses and convict offenders. One
can postulate a relation between the output of police and court "activity"
and various inputs of manpower, materials, and capital, asin. A =
f(m,c), wherefis a production function summarizing the "state of the
arts." Given f and input prices, increased "activity" would be more




It would be cheaper to achieve any given level of activity the cheaper
were policemen,8 judges, counsel, and juries ana the more highly de-
veloped the state of the arts, as determined by technologies like finger-
printing, wiretapping, computer control, and lie-detecting.9
One approximation to an empirical measure of "activity" is the num-
ber of offenses cleared by conviction. It can be written as
ApO, (7)
where p, the ratio of offenses cleared by convictions to all offenses, is
the overall probability that an offense is cleared by conviction. By sub-







if p00. An increase in either the probability of conviction or the num-
ber of offenses would increase total costs. If the marginal cost of in-
creased "activity" were rising, further implications would be that
8.According to the Crime Commission, 85—90 percent ofall police costs consist of
wages and salaries (President's Commission, 1967a, p. 35).
9. A task-force report by the Crime Commission deals with suggestions for greater
and more efficient usage of advanced technologies (President's Commission, 1967e).8 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
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C,,0C,,,, =C"pO+ C' > 0.
A more sophisticated and realistic approach drops the implication
of (7) that convictions alone measure "activity," or even that p and 0
have identical elasticities, and introduces the more general relation
A=h(p,0,a). (10)
The variable a stands for arrests and other determinants of "activity,"
and there is no presumption that the elasticity of I, with respect to p
equals that with respect to 0. Substitution yields the cost function C =
C(p, 0, a).If, as is extremely likely, h,,, h,, and h,, are all greater than
zero, then clearly C1,,C,,, andC,, are all greater than zero.
In order to insure that optimality positions do not lie at "corners," it
is necessary to place some restrictions on the second derivatives of the





(see the Mathematical Appendix). The first two restrictions are rather
plausible, the third much less so.'°
TableIindicates that in 1965 public expenditures in the United
States on police and courts totaled more than $3 billion, by no means a
minor item. Separate estimates were prepared for each of seven major
felonies." Expenditures on them averaged about $500 per offense (re-
ported) and about $2,000 per person arrested, with almost $1,000 being
spent per murder (President's Commission, l967a, pp. 264—65); $500 is
an estimate of the average cost
A
10. Differentiating the cost function yields C,,,,C"(h,,)' +C'/i,,;C,,,, = C"(/i,,)' +
C'h,,,,;C,,,, = Ch,/i,, + C/i,,,,. Ifmarginal costs were rising, C,,,orC,,.couldbe negative
only if h,,,orI'm,weresufficiently negative, whichisnot very likely. However, C,,,,would
be approximately zero only if h,,,weresufficiently negative, which is also unlikely. Note
that if "activity" is measured by convictions alone, h,,,= I,,,, = 0,and h,,,,> 0.
II. They are willful homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
larceny, and auto theft.GARY S.BECKER 9
(9)
of these felonies and would presumably be a larger figure if the number of
either arrests or Convictions were greater. Marginal costs (Ce)wouldbe
at least $500 if condition (11), C,,00, were assumed to hold throughout.
3. THE SUPPLY OF OFFENSES
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Theories about the determinants of the number of offenses differ greatly,
from emphasis on skull types and biological inheritance to family up-
bringing and disenchantment with society. Practically all the diverse
theories agree, however, that when other variables are held constant, an
increase in a person's probability of conviction or punishment if con-
victed would generally decrease, perhaps substantially, perhaps negligi-
bly, the number of offenses he commits. In addition, a common generali-
zation by persons with judicial experience is that a change in the prob-
ability has a greater effect on the number of offenses than a change in the
punishment,'2 although, as far as I can tell, none of the prominent theories
shed any light on this relation.
The approach taken here follows the economists' usual analysis of
choice and assumes that a person commits an offense if the expected
utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other
resources at other activities. Some persons become "criminals," there-
fore, not because their basic motivation differs from that of other persons,
but because their benefits and costs differ. I cannot pause to discuss the
many general implications of this approach,'3 except to remark that
criminal behavior becomes part of a much more general theory and does
not require ad hoc concepts of differential association, anomie, and the
like,'4 nor does it assume perfect knowledge, lightning-fast calculation, or
any of the other caricatures of economic theory.
This approach implies that there is a function relating the number of
offenses by any person to his probability of conviction, to his punishment
if convicted, and to other variables, such as the income available to him in
legal and other illegal activities, the frequency of nuisance arrests, and his
willingness to commit an illegal act. This can be represented as
12.For example, Lord Shawness (1965) said, "Some judges preoccupy themselves
with methods of punishment. This is their job. But in preventing crime itis of less
significance than they like to think. Certainty of detection is far more important than
severity of punishment." Also see the discussion of the ideas of C. B. Beccaria, an in-
sightful eighteenth-century Italian economist and criminologist, in Radzinowicz (1948, 1,
p. 282).
13. See, however, the discussions in Smigel (1965) and Ehrlich (1967).
14. For a discussion of these concepts, see Sutherland (1960).10 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
O3(p3, f,, U3), (12)
whereisthe number of offenses he would commit during a particu1ar
period, p3 his probability of conviction per offense, f,hispunishment per
offense, and u3 a portnianteau variable representing all these other in-
fluences.'5
Since only convicted offenders are punished, in effect there is "price
discrimination" and uncertainty: if convicted, he pays fperconvicted
offense, while otherwise he does not. An increase in either p, orf3 would
reduce the utility expected from an offense and thus would tend to reduce
the number of offenses because either the probability of "paying" the






which are the generally accepted restrictions mentioned above. The effect
of changes in some components of 113couldalso be anticipated. For ex-
ample, a rise in the income available in legal activities or an increase in
law-abidingness due, say, to "education" would reduce the incentive to
15.Bothandf3 mightbe considered distributions thatdependon the judge, jury,
prosecutor, etc., that j happens to receive. Among other things, U3dependson the p's and
f's meted out for other competing offenses. For evidence indicating that offenders do substi-
tute among offenses, see Smigel (1965).
16. The utility expected from committing an offense is defined as
EU., =pjUj(Y3—J) +(1—
whereY1 is his income, monetary plus psychic, from an offense; U, is his utility function;




as long as the marginal utility of income is positive. One could expand the analysis by in-
corporating the costs and probabilities of arrests, detentions, and trials that do not result
in conviction.
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GARY S. BECKER 11
enter illegal activities and thus would reduce the number of offenses. Or a
shift in the form of the punishment, say, from a fine to imprisonment,
would tend to reduce the number of offenses, at least temporarily, because
they cannot be committed while in prison.
This approach also has an interesting interpretation of the presumed
greater response to a change in the probability than in the punishment.
An increase in p) "compensated" by an equal percentage reduction in f,
wouldnot change the expected income from an offense couldchange
the expected utility, because the amount of risk would change. It is easily
shown that an increase in p,, would reduce the expected utility, and thus
the number of offenses, more than an equal percentage increase inf,jfj
has preference for risk; the increase inwouldhave the greater effect if
he has aversion to risk; and they would have the same effect if he is risk
neutral.15 The widespread generalization that offenders are more deterred
by the probability of conviction than by the punishment when convicted
turns out to imply in the expected-utility approach that offenders are risk
preferrers, at least in the relevant region of punishments.
The total number of offenses is the sum of all the 0, and would de-
pend on the set of p,,f, and U,,.Althoughthese variables are likely to differ
significantly between persons because of differences in intelligence, age,
education, previous offense history, wealth, family upbringing, etc., for
simplicity I now consider only their average values, p,f, and u,2° and write
17.
18.This means that an increase in
p,
"compensated" by a reduction in f,wouldreduce
utility and offenses.
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The term on the left is the average change in utility between Y3 —j5 and Y,.Itwould be
greater than, equal to, or less than U(Y,—f,,)as U'0. But risk preference is defined by
U7 > 0, neutrality by 0, and aversion by U7 < 0.
20. p can be defined as a weighted average of the p,, as
iTh
i-I
and similar definitions hold fcn-f and u.12 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
the market offense function as
0 = O(p,f, u). (14)
This function is assumed to have the same kinds of properties as the
individual functions, in particular, to be negatively related to p and f and
to be more responsive to the former than the latter if, and only if, offenders
on balance have risk preference. Smigel (1965) and Ehrlich (1967) esti-
mate functions like (14) for seven felonies reported by the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation using state data as the basic unit of observation.
They find that the relations are quite stable, as evidenced by high corre-
lation coefficients; that there are significant negative effects on 0ofp
and f; and that usually the effect of p exceeds that of f, indicating
preference for risk in the region of observation.
A well-known result states that, in equilibrium, the real incomes of
persons in risky activities are, at the margin, relatively high or low as
persons are generally risk avoiders or preferrers. If offenders were risk
preferrers, this implies that the real income of offenders would he lower,
at the margin, than the incomes they could receive in less risky legal
activities, and conversely if they were risk avoiders. Whether "crime
pays" is then an implication of the attitudes offenders have toward risk
and is not directly related to the efficiency of the police or the amount
spent on combating crime. If, however, risk were preferred at some values
of p and f and disliked at others, public policy could influence whether
"crime pays" by its choice of p andf. Indeed, it is shown later that the
social loss from illegal activities is usually minimized by selecting p and
f in regions where risk is preferred, that is, in regions where "crime does
not pay."
4. PUNISHMENTS
Mankind has invented a variety of ingenious punishments to inflict on
convicted offenders: death, torture, branding, fines, imprisonment, ban-
ishment, restrictions on movement and occupation, and loss of citizen-
ship are just the more common ones. In the United States, less serious
offenses are punished primarily by fines, supplemented occasionally by
probation, petty restrictions like temporary suspension of one's driver's
license, and imprisonment. The more serious offenses are punished by a
combination of probation, imprisonment, parole, fines, and various re-
strictions on choice of occupation. A recent survey estimated for an
average day in 1965 the number of persons who were either on probation,
parole, or institutionalized in a jail or juvenile home (President's Corn-
mission, 1967b). Th
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came to about 1,300,000, which is about 2 per cent of the labor force.
About one-half were on probation, one-third were institutionalized, and
the remaining one-sixth were on parole.
The cost of different punishments to an offender can be made com-
parable by converting them into their monetary equivalent or worth,
which, of course, is directly measured only for fines. For example, the
cost of an imprisonment is the discounted sum of the earnings foregone
and the value placed on the restrictions in consumption and freedom.
Since the earnings foregone and the value placed on prison restrictions
vary from person to person, the cost even of a prison sentence of given
duration is not a unique quantity but is generally greater, for example, to
offenders who could earn more outside of prison.2' The cost to each of-
fender would be greater the longer the prison sentence, since both fore-
gone earnings and foregone consumption are positively related to the
length of sentences.
Punishments affect not only offenders but also other members of
society. Aside from collection costs, fines paid by offenders are received
as revenue by others. Most punishments, however, hurt other members
as well as offenders: for example, imprisonment requires expenditures on
guards, supervisory personnel, buildings, food, etc. Currently about $1
billion is being spent each year in the United States on probation, parole,
and institutionalization alone, with the daily cost per case varying tremen-
dously from a low of $0.38 for adults on probation to a high of $11.00
for juveniles in detention institutions (President's Commission, 1967b,
pp. 193—94).
The total social cost of punishments is the cost to offenders plus the
cost or minus the gain to others. Fines produce a gain to the latter that
equals the cost to offenders, aside from collection costs, and so the
social cost of fines is about zero, as befits a transfer payment. The social
cost of probation, imprisonment, and other punishments, however, gen-
erally exceeds that to offenders, because others are also hurt. The der-
ivation of optimality conditions in the next section is made more con-
venient if social costs are written in terms of offender costs as
(15)
wheref' is the social cost and bisa coefficient that transforms fintof'.
The size of bvariesgreatly between different kinds of punishments:
21. In this respect, imprisonment is a special case of "waiting time'S pricing that is
also exemplified by queueing (see Becker, 1965, esp. pp. 5 15—16, and Kleinman, 1967).14 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
b0 for fines, while b>1 for torture, probation, parole, imprisonment,
and most other punishments. It is especially large for juveniles in deten-
tion homes or for adults in prisons and is rather close to unity for torture
or for adults on parole.
III. OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS
The relevant parameters and behavioral functions have been introduced,
and the stage is set for a discussion of social policy. If the aim simply
were deterrence, the probability of conviction, p, could be raised clOse to
1, and punishments,f, could be made to exceed the gain: in this way the
number of offenses, 0,couldbe reduced almost at will. However, an in-
crease in p increases the social cost of offenses through its effect on the
cost of combating offenses, C,asdoes an increase inf if b > 0 through
the effect on the cost of punishments, bf. At relatively modest values of
p and f, these effects might outweigh the social gain from increased
deterrence. Similarly, if the aim simply were to make "the punishment
fit the crime," p could be set close to 1, and f could be equated to the
harm imposed on the rest of society. Again, however, such a policy ig-
nores the social cost of increases in p andf.
What is needed is a criterion that goes beyond catchy phrases and
gives due weight to the damages from offenses, the costs of apprehending
and convicting offenders, and the social cost of punishments. The social-
welfare function of modern welfare economics is such a criterion, and
one might assume that society has a function that measures the social
loss from offenses. If
(16)
is the function measuring social loss, with presumably
abf>°' (17)
the aim would be to select values off, C, and possibly b that minimize L.
It is more convenient and transparent, however, to develop the dis-
cussion at this point in terms of a less general formulation, namely, to
assume that the loss function is identical with the total social loss in real
income from offenses, convictions, and punishments, as in
L=D(0)+C(p, 0)+bpfo. (18)
The term bpfo is the total social loss from punishments, since bf is the
loss per offense punished and p0 is the number of offenses punished (if
there are a fairly Ia
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there are a fairly large number of independent offenses). The variables
directly subject to social control are the amounts spent in combating
offenses, C;the punishment peroffense for those convicted, f; andthe
form of punishments, summarized by b.Oncechosen, these variables,
viathe D, C, and 0functions, indirectly determine p, 0, D,andultimately
theloss L.
Analyticalconvenience suggests that p rather than Cbeconsidered
a decision variable. Also, the coefficient b is assumed in this section to be
a given constant greater than zero. Then p and fare the only decision
variables, and their optimal values are found by differentiating L to find




If 0,and0,,arenot equal to zero, one can dividethrough by them, and
recombine terms, to get the more interesting expressions







p Lv = 0,,.
Theterm on the left side of each equation gives the marginal cost of
increasing the number of offenses, 0: in equation (21) through a reduction
infand in (22) through a reduction in p. Since C'>0 and 0is assumed
to be in a region where D'>0, the marginal cost of increasing 0through
5ly









f mustbe positive. A reduction in p partly reduces the cost of combating
offenses, and, therefore, the marginal cost of increasing 0 must be less
when p rather than when f is reduced (see Figure 1); the former could
even be negative ifwere sufficiently large. Average "revenue," given
by —bpf, is negative, but marginal revenue, given by the right-hand side of
equations (21) and (22), is not necessarily negative and would be positive
if the elasticities €,, and e,were less than unity. Since the loss is minimized
when marginal revenue equals marginal cost (see Figure 1), the optimal
value of Cf must be less than unity, and that of e,, could only exceed unity
if C,,weresufficiently large.Thisis a reversal of the usual equilibrium
condition for an income-maximizing firm, which is that the elasticity of
demand must exceed unity, because in the usual case average revenue is
assumed to be
Since the marginal cost of changing 0 through a change in p is less
than that of changing 0 throughf, the equilibrium marginal revenue from
p must also be less than that fromf. But equations (21) and (22) indicate
23.Thus if b < 0, average revenue would be positive and the optimalvalueofEj
would be greater than 1, and that of a,, could be less thanI only if C,, were sufficiently
large.
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pointed out earlier, however, this is precisely the condition indicating
that offenders have preference for risk and thus that "crime does not
pay." Consequently, the loss from offenses is minimized if p and fare
selected from those regions where offenders are, on balance, risk pre-
ferrers. Although only the attitudes offenders have toward risk can
directly determine whether "crime pays," rational public policy indirectly
insures that "crime does not pay" through its choice of p and f.24
Iindicated earlier that the actual p's andf's for major felonies in the
United States generally seem to be in regions where the effect (measured
by elasticity) of p on offenses exceeds that off, that is, where offenders are
risk preferrers and "crime does not pay" (Smigel, 1965; Ehrlich, 1967).
Moreover, both elasticities are generally less than unity. In both respects,
therefore, actual public policy is consistent with the implications of the
optimality analysis.
If the supply of offenses depended only on pf—offenders were risk
neutral —areduction in p "compensated" by an equal percentage increase
inf would leave unchanged pf,0,D(0), and bpfo but would reduce the
loss, because the costs of apprehension and conviction would be lowered
by the reduction in p. The loss would be minimized, therefore, by lower-
ing p arbitrarily close to zero and raisingf sufficiently high so that the
product pf would induce the optimal number of offenses.25 A fortiori, if
offenders were risk avoiders, the loss would be minimized by setting p
arbitrarily close to zero, for a "compensated" reduction in p reduces not
only C but also 0 and thus D and bpf0.2°
There was a tendency during the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies in Anglo-Saxon countries (and even today in many Communist and
underdeveloped countries) to punish those convicted of criminal offenses
rather severely, at the same time that the probability of captute and con-
24. If b< 0,the optimality condition is that e,. <€1' orthat offenders are risk avoiders.
Optimal social policy would thenbe to select p and fin regions where "crimedoespay."
25. Since €, = e,, =if 0 depends only on pf, and C = 0 if p = 0, the two equilibrium
conditions given by eqs. (21) and (22) reduce to the single condition
D' =_bPf(l.J)
From this condition and the relation 0 = O(pj), the equilibrium values of 0 and pf could
be determined.
26. If b < 0, the optimal solution is p about zero and farbitrarilyhigh if offenders
are either risk neutral or risk preferrers.18 CRiME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
viction was set at rather low values.27 A promising explanation of this
tendency is that an increased probability of conviction obviously absorbs
public and private resources in the form of more policemen,judges,juries,
and so forth. Consequently, a "compensated" reduction in this proba-
bility obviously reduces expenditures on combating crime, and, since the
expected punishment is unchanged, there is no "obvious" offsetting
increase in either the amount of damages or the cost of punishments.
The result can easily be continuous political pressureto keep police and
other expenditures relatively low and to compensate by meting out strong
punishments to those convicted.
Of course, if offenders are risk preferrers, the loss in income from
offenses is generally minimized by selecting positive and finite values of
p and f, even though there is no "obvious" offset to a compensated
reduction in p. One possible offset already hinted at in footnote 27 is
that judges or juries may be unwilling to convict offenders if punishments
are set very high. Formally, this means that the cost of apprehension and
Conviction, C, would depend not only on p and 0 but also on If C
were more responsive tofthan to p, at least in some regions,29 the loss in
income could be minimized at finite values of p and f even if offenders
were risk avoiders. For then a compensated reduction in p could raise,
rather than lower, C and thus contribute to an increase in the loss.
Risk avoidance might also be consistent with optimal behavior if
the loss function were not simply equal to the reduction in income. For
example, suppose that the loss were increased by an increase in the ex
post "price discrimination" between offenses that are not and those that
are cleared by punishment. Then a "compensated" reduction in p would
increase the "price discrimination," and the increased loss from this
could more than offset the reductions in C, D, and bpf0.3°
27.For a discussion of English criminal law in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, see Radzinowicz (1948, Vol. 1). Punishments were severe then, even though the
death penalty, while legislated, was seldom implemented for less serious criminal offenses.
Recently South Vietnam executed a prominent businessman allegedly for "specula-
tive" dealings in rice, while in recent years a number of persons in the Soviet Union have
either been executed or given severe prison sentences for economic crimes.
28.1 owe the emphasis on this point to Evsey Domar.
29. This is probably more likely for higher values off and lower values of p.
30. if p is the probability that an offense would be cleared with the punishment f,
then I —pis the probability of no punishment. The expected punishment would be= pf.
thevariance= p(l—p)ft,and the coefficient of variation
IT::-;;
v =—='p
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IV. SHIFTS IN THE BEHAViORAL RELATIONS
This section analyzes the effects of shifts in the basic behavioral rela-
tions—the damage, cost, and supply-of-offenses functions—on the opti-
mal values of p andf Since rigorous proofs can be found in the Mathe-
matical Appendix, here the implications are stressed, and only intuitive
proofs are given. The results are used to explain, among other things,
why more damaging offenses are punished more severely and more impul-
sive offenders less severely.
An increase in the marginal damages from a given number of offenses,
D',increasesthe marginal cost of changing offenses by a change in either
p or f (see Figures 2a and b).Theoptimal number of offenses would
necessarily decrease, because the optimal values of both p and f would
increase. In this case (and, as shortly seen, in several others), the optimal
values of p and f move in the same, rather than in opposite, directions.3'
An interesting application of these conclusions is to different kinds
of offenses. Although there are few objective measures of the damages
done by most offenses, it does not take much imagination to conclude
that offenses like murder or rape generally do more damage than petty
larceny or auto theft. If the other components of the loss in income were
t'increases monotonically from a low of zero when p = I to an infinitely high value when
p = ci.
If the loss function equaled




Since the term ispositive, it could more than offset the negative term
31.1 stress this primarily because of Bentham's famous and seemingly plausible dictum
that "the more deficient in certainty a punishment is, the severer it should be" (1931, chap.
ii of section entitled "Of Punishment," second rule). The dictum would be correct if p
(orf) were exogenously determined and if L were minimized with respect tof(orp) alone,
for then the optimal value off(or p) would be inversely related to the given value of p (orf)
(see the Mathematical Appendix). If, however. L is minimized with respect to both, then
frequently they move in the same direction.
— -20 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
Marginal Marginal
cost cost =







the same, the optimal probability of apprehension and conviction and the
punishment when convicted would be greater for the more serious offenses.
Table 2 presents some evidence on the actual probabilities and
punishments in the United States for seven felonies. The punishments H
are simply the average prison sentences served, while the probabilities
are ratios of the estimated number of convictions to the estimated number
of offenses and unquestionably contain a large error (see the discussions i—
in Smigel, 1965, and Ehrlich, 1967). If other components of the loss func-
tion are ignored, and if actual and optimal probabilities and punishments
are positively related, one should find that the more serious felonies have
higher probabilities and longer prison terms. And one does: in the table, —
whichlists the felonies in decreasing order of presumed seriousness, <
boththe actual probabilities and the prison terms are positively related
toseriousness.
Since an increase in the marginal cost of apprehension and convic-
tion for a given number of offenses, C',hasidentical effects as an increase
in marginal damages, it must also reduce the optimal number of offenses
and increase the optimal values of p andf. On the other hand, an increase
in the other component of the cost of apprehension and conviction,
hasno direct effect on the marginal cost of changing offenses with f and
reducesthecost of changing offenses with p (see Figure 3). It therefore
reduces the optimal value of p and only partially compensates with an
increase in f, so that the optimal number of pifenses increases. Accord-
ingly, an increase in both C'andC,.mustincrease the optimaif but can
either increase or decrease the optimal p and optimal number of offenses,
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The cost of apprehending and convicting offenders is affected by a
variety of forces. An increase in the salaries of policemen increases both
C'andC,,,whileimproved police technology in the form of fingerprinting,
ballistic techniques, computer control, and chemical analysis, or police
and court "reform" with an emphasis on professionalism and merit,
would tend to reduce both, not necessarily by the same extent. Our anal y-
sis implies, therefore, that although an improvement in technology and
reform may or may not increase the optimal p and reduce the optimal
number of offenses, it does reduce the optimalf and thus the need to rely
on severe punishments for those convicted. Possibly this explains why the
secular improvement in police technology and reform has gone hand in
hand with a secular decline in punishments.
C,,,andto a lesser extent C',differsignificantly between different
kinds of offenses. It is easier, for example, to solve a rape or armed rob-
bery than a burglary or auto theft, because the evidence of personal identi-
fication is often available in the former and not in the latter offenses.32
This might tempt one to argue that the p's decline significantly as one
moves across Table 2 (left to right) primarily because the Co's are sig-
nificantly lower for the "personal" felonies listed to the left than for the
"impersonal" felonies listed to the right. But this implies that the f's
would increase as one moved across the table, which is patently false.
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a- 32. "If a suspect is neither known to the victim nor arrested at the scene of the crime,
the chances of ever arresting him are very slim" (President's Commission, 1967e, p. 8).
This conclusion is based on a study of crimes in parts of Los Angeles during January, 1966.APPROACH GARY S. BECKER 23
offenses observed in the table cannot be explained by a negative correla-
tion between(orC')andseverity.
If b>0, a reduction in the elasticity of offenses with respect to f
increases the marginal revenue of changing offenses by changing f (see
Figure 4a). The result is an increase in the optimal number of offenses and
a decrease in the optimalf that is partially compensated by an increase in
the optimal p. Similarly, a reduction in the elasticity of offenses with
respect to p also increases the optimal number of offenses (see Figure
4b),decreasesthe optimal p. and partially compensates by an increase in
f An equal percentage reduction in both elasticities a fortiori increases
the optimal number of offenses and also tends to reduce both p and f
If b= 0,both marginal revenue functions lie along the horizontal axis,
and changes in these elasticities have no effect on the optimal values of
p andf
The income of a firm would usually be larger if it could separate, at
little cost, its total market into submarkets that have substantially dif-
ferent elasticities of demand: higher prices would be charged in the sub-
markets having lower elasticities. Similarly, if the total "market" for
offenses could be separated into submarkets that differ significantly in
the elasticities of supply of offenses, the results above imply that if b>0
the total loss would be reduced by "charging" lower"prices"—that is,
lower p's and f's—in markets with !owei-elasticities.
Sometimes it is possible to separate persons committing the same
offense into groups that have different responses to punishments. For
example, unpremeditated murderers or robbers are supposed to act
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FIGURE 424 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
punishments; likewise, the insane or the young are probably less affected
than other offenders by future consequences and, therefore,33 probably
less deterred by increases in the probability of conviction or in the pun-
ishment when convicted. The trend during the twentieth century toward
relatively smaller prison terms and greater use of probation and therapy
for such groups and, more generally, the trend away from the doctrine of
"a given punishment for a given crime" is apparently at least broadly
consistent with the implications of the optimality analysis.
An increase in bincreasesthe marginal revenue from changing the
number of offenses by changing p orf and thereby increases the optimal
number of offenses, reduces the optimal value off, and increases the opti-
mal value of p. Some evidence presented in Section II indicates that bis
especially large for juveniles in detention homes or adults in prison and
is small for fines or adults on parole. The analysis implies, therefore, that
other things the same, the optimal f's would be smaller and the optimal
p's larger if punishment were by one of the former rather than one of the
latter methods.
V. FINES
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A. WELFARETHEOREMS AND TRANSFERABLEPRICING
The usual optimality conditions in welfare economics depend only on the
levels and not on the slopes of marginal cost and average revenue func-
tions, as in the well-known condition that marginal costs equal prices.
The social loss from offenses was explicitly introduced as an application
of the approach used itt welfare economics, and yet slopes as incorporated
into elasticities of supply do significantly affect the optimality conditions.
Why this difference? The primary explanation would appear to be that
it is almost always implicitly assumed that prices paid by consumers are
fully transferred to firms and governments, so that there is no social loss
from payment.
If there were no social loss from punishments, as with fines, b would
equal zero, and the elasticity of supply would drop out of the optimality
condition given by equation If b > 0, as with imprisonment, some
33. But see Becker (1962) for an analysis indicating that impulsive and other "irra-
tional" personsmay be as deterred from purchasing a commodity whose price has risen
as more "rational" persons.
34. It remains in eq. (22), through the slope becauseordinarily prices do not affect
marginal costs, while they do here through the influence of p on C.
Economists generall
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ofthe payment "by" offenders would not be received by the rest of
society, and a net social loss would result. The elasticity of the supply of
offenses then becomes an important determinant of the optimality con-
ditions, because it determines the change in social costs caused by a
change in punishments.
Although transferable monetary pricing is the most common kind
today, the other is not unimportant, especially in underdeveloped and
Communist countries. Examples in addition to imprisonment and many
other punishments are the draft, payments in kind, and queues and other
waiting-time forms of rationing that result from legal restrictions on pric-
ing (see Becker, 1965)andfrom random variations in demand and supply
conditions. it is interesting, and deserves further exploration, that the
optimality conditions are so significantly affected by a change in the
assumptions about the transferability of pricing.
B. OPTEMALITY CoNDITIoNs
If b= 0,say, because punishment was by fine, and if the cost of appre-
hending and convicting offenders were also zero, the two optiniality
conditions (21) and (22) would reduce to the same simple condition
D'(O)0. (24)
Economists generally conclude that activities causing "external" harm,
such as factories that pollute the air or lumber operations that strip the
land, should be taxed or otherwise restricted in level until the marginal
external harm equaled the marginal private gain, that is, until marginal
net damages equaled zero, which is what equation (24) says. If marginal
harm always exceeded marginal gain, the optimum level would be pre-
sumed to be zero, and that would also be the implication of (24) when
suitable inequality conditions were brought in. In other words, if the costs
of apprehending, convicting, and punishing offenders were nil and if each
offense caused more external harm than private gain, the social loss from
offenses would be minimized by setting punishments high enough to
eliminate all offenses. Minimizing the social loss would become identical
with the criterion of minimizing crime by setting penalties sufficiently
high.35
Equation (24) determines the optimal number of offenses, O,and
the fine and probability of conviction must be set at levels that induce
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offenders to commit just Ooffenses.If the economists' usual theory of
choice is applied to illegal activities (see Sec. II), the marginal value of
these penalties has to equal the marginal private gain:
V= G'(O), (25)
where G '(O)isthe marginal private gain at OandV is the monetary value
of the marginal penalties. Since by equations (3) and (24), D'(O) =H'(O)
—G'(O)=0,one has by substitution in (25)
V= H'(O). (26)
The monetary value of the penalties would equal the marginal harm
caused by offenses.
Since the cost of apprehension and conviction is assumed equal to
zero, the probability of apprehension and conviction could be set equal
to unity without cost. The monetary value of penalties would then simply
equal the fines imposed, and equation (26) would become
f =H'(Ô). (27)
Since fines are paid by offenders to the rest of society, a fine determined
by (27) would exactly compensate thelatter for the marginal harm suf-
fered, and the criterion of minimizing the social loss would be identical,
at the margin, with the criterion of compensating "victims."if the harm
to victims always exceeded the gain to offenders, both criteria would
reduce in turn to eliminating all offenses.
If the cost of apprehension and conviction were not zero, the optimal-
ity condition would have to incorporate marginal costs as well as marginal
damages and would become, if the probability of conviction were still
assumed to equal unity,
D'(O)+C'(O, 1)=0. (28)
Since C' > 0, (28) requires that D' < 0 or that the marginal private gain
exceed the marginal external harm, which generally means a smaller
number of offenses than when D' = It is easy to show that equation
(28) would be satisfied if the fine equaled the sum of marginal harm and
marginal costs:
36. By "victims"is meantthe rest of society and not just the persons actually harmed.
37. This result can also bederivedas a specialcaseof the resultsinthe Mathematical
Appendix on the effects of increases in C'.
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f= H'(O) + C'(O, l).38 (29)
In other words, offenders have to compensate for the cost of catching
them as well as for the harm they directly do, which is a natural general-
ization of the usual externality analysis.
The optimality condition
D'(O) + C'(O, j5) + CP(O, j5)=0 (30)
would replace equation (28) if the fine rather than the probability of
Conviction were fixed. Equation (30) would usually imply that D'(O)
> and thus that the number of offenses would exceed the optimal
number when costs were zero. Whether costs of apprehension and con-
viction increase or decrease the optimal number of offenses largely de-
pends, therefore, on whether penalties are changed by a change in the
fine or in the probability of conviction. Of course, if both are subject to
control, the optimal probability of conviction would be arbitrarily close
to zero, unless the social loss function differed from equation (18) (see
the discussion in Sec. III).
C. THE CASE FOR FINES
Just as the probability of conviction and the severity of punishment are
subject to control by society, so too is the form of punishment: legislation
usually specifies whether an offense is punishable by fines, probation,
institutionalization, or some combination. Is it merely an accident, or
38. Since equilibrium requires thatf= G'(O),andsince from (28)
0(O) =H'(O)—G'(O)=— C'(O,1),
then (29) followsdirectlyby substitution.
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have optimality considerations determined that today, in most countries,
fines are the predominant form of punishment, with institutionalization re-
served for the more serious offenses? This section presents several argu-
ments which imply that social welfare is increased if fines are used it'hen-
ever feasible.
Inthe first place, probation and institutionalization use up social re-
sources, and fines do not, since the latter are basically just transfer pay-
ments, while the former use resources in the form of guards, supervisory
personnel, probation officers, and the offenders' own time.4° Table 1 indi-
cates that the cost is not minor either: in the United States in 1965,about
$1 billion was spent on "correction," and this estimate excludes, of
course, the value of the loss in offenders' time.41
Moreover, the determination of the optimal number of offenses and
severity of punishments is somewhat simplified by the use of fines. A
wise use of fines requires knowledge of marginal gains and harm and of
marginal apprehension and conviction costs; admittedly, such knowledge
is not easily acquired. A wise user of imprisonment and other punish-
ments must know this too, however; and, in addition, must know about
the elasticities of response of offenses to changes in punishments. As the
bitter controversies over the abolition of capital punishment suggest, it
has been difficult to learn about these elasticities.
I suggested earlier that premeditation, sanity, and age can enter into
the determination of punishments as proxies for the elasticities of re-
sponse. These characteristics may not have to be considered in levying
fines, because the optimal fines, as determined, say, by equations (27)
or (29), do not depend on elasticities. Perhaps this partly explains why
economists discussing externalities almost never mention motivation or
intent, while sociologists and lawyers discussing criminal behavior in-
variably do. The former assume that punishment is by a monetary tax or
fine, while the latter assume that nonmonetary punishments are used.
Fines provide compensation to victims, and optimal fines at the mar-
gin fully compensate victims and restore the status quo ante, so that
40.Several early writers on criminology recognized this advantage of fines. For ex-
ample. "Pecuniary punishments are highly economical, since all the evil felt by him who
pays turns into an advantage for him who receives" (Bentham, 1931, chap. vi), and "Im-
prisonment would have been regarded in these old times Ica. tenth as a useless
punishment; it does not satisfy revenge, it keeps the criminal idle, and do what we may,
ii is cost/v' (Pollock and Maitland, 1952, p. 516; my italics).
41. On the other hand, some transfer payments in the form of food, clothing, and
shelter are included.
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they are no worse off than if offenses were not committed.42 Not only do
other punishments fail to compensate, but they also require "victims" to
spend additional resources in carrying out the punishment. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the anger and fear felt toward ex-convicts who in
fact have not"paidtheir debt to society" have resulted in additionaf
punishments,43 including legal restrictions on their political and economic
opportunitiesand informal restrictions on their social acceptance.
Moreover, the absence of compensation encourages efforts to change and
otherwise"rehabilitate"offendersthroughpsychiatriccounseling,
therapy, and other programs. Since fines do compensate and do not create
much additional cost, anger toward and fear of appropriately fined per-
sons do not easily develop. As a result, additional punishments are not
usually levied against "ex-finees," nor are strong efforts made to "re-
habilitate" them.
One argument made against fines is that they are immoral because,
in effect, they permit offenses to be bought for a price in the same way that
bread or other goods are bought for a price.45 A fine canbeconsidered
the price of an offense, but so too can any other form of punishment; for
example, the "price" of stealing a car might be six months in jail. The
only difference is in the units of measurement: fines are prices measured
in monetary units, imprisonments are prices measured in time units, etc.
If anything, monetary units are to be preferred here as they are generally
preferred in pricing and accounting.
Optimal fines determined from equation (29) depend only on the
marginal harm and cost and not at all on the economic positions of offend-
ers. This has been criticized as unfair, and fines proportional to the in-
42. Bentham recognized this and said, "To furnish an indemnity to the injured party is
another useful quality in a punishment. It is a means of accomplishing two objects at once—
punishing an offense and repairing it: removing the evil of the first order, and putting a stop
to alarm. This is a characteristic advantage of pecuniary punishments" (1931, chap. vi).
43. In the same way, the guilt felt by society in using the draft, a forced transfer to
society,has led to additional payments to veterans in the form of education benefits,
bonuses, hospitalization rights, etc.
44. See Sutherland (1960, pp. 267—68) for a list of some ut these.
45. The very early English law relied heavily on monetary fines, even for murder, and
it has been said that "every kind of blow or wound given to every kind of person had its
price, and much of the jurisprudence of the time must have consisted of a knowledge of
these preappointed prices" (Pollock and Maitland, 1952, p. 451).
The same idea was put amusingly in a recent MuttandJeff cartoon which showed a
police car carrying a sign that read: "Speed limit 30 M per H—$5 fine every mile over
speed limit—pick out speed you can afford."30 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
comes of offenders have been suggested.46 If the goal is to minimize the
social loss in income from offenses, and not to take vengeance or to inflict
harm on offenders, then fines should depend on the total harm done by
offenders, and not directly on their income, race, sex, etc. In the same
way, the monetary value of optimal prison sentences and other punish-
ments depends on the harm, costs, and elasticities of response, but not
directly on an offender's income. Indeed, if the monetary value of the
punishment by, say, imprisonment were independent of income, the
length of the sentence would be inverselyrelatedto income, because the
value placed on a given sentence is positively related to income.
We might detour briefly to point out some interesting implications
for the probability of conviction of the fact that the monetary value of a
given fine is obviously the same for all offenders, while the monetary
equivalent or "value" of a given prison sentence or probation period is
generally positively related to an offender's income. The discussion in
Section 11 suggested that actual probabilities of conviction are not fixed
to all offenders but usually vary with their age, sex, race, and, in particu-
lar, income. Offenders with higher earnings have an incentive to spend
more on planning their offenses, on good lawyers, on legal appeals, and
even on bribery to reduce the probability of apprehension and conviction
for offenses punishable by, say, a given prison term, because the cost to
them of conviction is relatively large compared to the cost of these ex-
penditures. Similarly, however, poorer offenders have an incentive to
use more of their time in planning their offenses, in court appearances, and
the like, to reduce the probability of conviction for offenses punishable
by a given fine, because the cost to them of conviction is relatively large
compared to the value of their time.47 The implication is that the prob-
ability of conviction would be systematically related to the earnings of
offenders: negatively for offenses punishable by imprisonment and pos-
itively for those punishable by fines. Although a negative relation for
46.For example, Bentham said, "A pecuniary punishment, if the sum is fixed, is in the
highest degree unequal. .. Fines have been determined without regard to theprofit of the
offense, to its evil, or to the wealth of the offender. ... Pecuniary punishments should al-
ways be regulated by the fortune of the offender. The relative amount of the fine should be
fixed, not its absolute amount; for such an offense, such a part of the offender's fortune"
(1931, chap. ix). Note that optimal fines, as determined by eq. (29), do depend on "the profit
of the offense" and on "its evil."
47. Note that the incentive to use time to rcduce the probability of a given prison sen-
tence is unrelated to earnings, because the punishment is fixed in time, not monetary, units;
likewise, the incentive to use money to reduce the probability of a given fine is also unrelated
to earnings, because the punishment is fixed in monetary, not time, units.
felonies and other c
quently observed an
139—53), 1 do not kn
recognition that the
quence of the nature
Another argumc
murder or rape, are
pensatethe harm
special case of the n
exclusively wheneve:
then victims could no





need for a flexible
fines more readily an
This analysis im
given offense and oth'
by fine and the latte
these methods
fore the cry is raised ti
consider the follOwin1
Those punished





one, the former is co
when apprehended. Y
subsequently
the poor man, in effec
Whether a punis
offenders lacking suffi
48. In one study, abou
(see President's Commissk
49. The "debtor priso
repay loans.APPROACH GARY S. BECKER 31
al is to minimize the
engeance or to inflict
total harm done by
ex, etc. In the same
and other punish-
of response, but not
onetary value of the




monetary value of a
while the monetary
fr probation period is
The discussion in
riviction are not fixed
and, in particu-
in incentive to spend
legal appeals, and
and conviction
because the cost to
cost of these ex-
aye an incentive to
urt appearances, and
offenses punishable
Ion is relatively large
is that the prob-
to the earnings of
prisonment and pos-
kegative relation for
thesum isfixed, isin the
regard to the profit of the
y punishments should al-
ount of the fine should be
f the offender's fortune"
,do depend on 'the profit
ity of a given prison sen-
me, not monetary, units;
iven fine is also unrelated
e, units.
felonies and other offenses punishable by imprisonment has been fre-
quently observed and deplored (see President's Commission, 1967c, pp.
1 39—53), I do not know of any studies of the relation for fines or of any
recognition that the observed negative relation may be more a conse-
quence of the nature of the punishment than of the influence of wealth.
Another argument made against fines is that certain crimes, like
murder or rape, are so heinous that no amount of money could com-
pensate for the harm inflicted. This argument has obvious merit and is a
special case of the more general principle that fines cannot be relied on
exclusively whenever the harm exceeds the resources of offenders. For
then victims could not be fully compensated by offenders, and fines would
have to be supplemented with prison terms or other punishments in order
to discourage offenses optimally. This explains why imprisonments,
probation, and parole are major punishments for the more serious felon-
ies; considerable harm is inflicted, and felonious offenders lack sufficient
resources to compensate. Since fines are preferable, it also suggests the
need for a flexible system of instalment fines to enable offenders to pay
fines more readily and thus avoid other punishments.
This analysis implies that if some offenders could pay the fine for a
given offense and others could not,48 the former should be punished solely
by fine and the latter partly by other methods. In essence, therefore,
these methods become a vehicle for punishing "debtors" to society. Be-
fore the cry is raised that the system is unfair, especially to poor offenders,
consider the following.
Those punished would be debtors in "transactions" that were never
agreed to by their "creditors," not in voluntary transactions, such as
loans,48 for which suitable precautions could be taken in advance by
creditors. Moreover, punishment in any economic system based on
voluntary market transactions inevitably must distinguish between such
"debtors" and others. If a rich man purchases a car and a poor man steals
one, the former is congratulated, while the latter is often sent to prison
when apprehended. Yet the rich man's purchase is equivalent to a "theft"
subsequently compensated by a "fine" equal to the price of the car, while
the poor man, in effect, goes to prison because he cannot pay this "fine."
Whether a punishment like imprisonment in lieu of a full fine for
offenders lacking sufficient resources is "fair" depends, of course, on the
48.In one study, about half of those convicted of misdemeanors could not pay the fines
(see President's Commission, 1967c. p. 148).
49. The "debtor prisons" of earlier centuries generally housed persons who could not
repay loans.32 CRIME ANDPUNISHMENT:AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
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length of the prison term compared to the fine.50 For example, a prison
term of one week in lieu of a $10,000 fine would, if anything, be "unfair"
to wealthy offenders paying the fine. Since imprisonment is a more costly
punishment to society than fines, the loss from offenses would be reduced
by a policy of leniency toward persons who are imprisoned because they
cannot pay fines. Consequently, optimal prison terms for "debtors" would
not be "unfair" to them in the sense that the monetary equivalent to them
of the prison terms would be less than the value of optimal fines, which in
turn would equal the harm caused or the "debt." 51
Itappears, however, that "debtors" are often imprisoned at rates of
exchange with fines that place a low value on time in prison. Although I
have not seen systematic evidence on the different punishments actually
offered convicted offenders, and the choices they made, many statutes in
the United States do permit fines and imprisonment that place a low value
on time in prison. For example, in New York State, Class A Misde-
meanors can be punished by a prison term as long as one year or a fine no
50. \'et without any discussion of the actual alternatives offered, the statement is made
that "the money judgment assessed the punitive damages defendant hardly seems compara-
ble in effect to the criminal sanctions of death, imprisonment, and stigmatization" ("Criminal
Safeguards 1967).
SI. A formal proof is straightforward if for simplicity the probability of conviction is
taken as equal to unity. For then the sole optimality condition is
(1')
\
Since D' = H' — C', by substitution one has
(2')
and since equilibrium requires that C' =f,




I— b(I — 11€,)
If b > 0, €, < I(see Sec. 111), and hence by eq. (4'),
(5')
where the term on the right is the full marginal harm. If p as well asfis free to vary, the
analysis becomes more complicated, but the conclusion about the relative monetary values
of optimal imprisonments and fines remains the same (see the Mathematical Appendix).APPROACH GARY S. BECKER 33
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larger than $1,000 and Class B Misdemeanors, by a term as long as three
months or a fine no larger than $500 (Laws of New York, 1965, chap.
1030, Arts. 70 and 80).52 According to my analysis, these statutes permit
excessive prison sentences relative to the fines, which may explain why
imprisonment in lieu of fines is considered unfair to poor offenders, who
often must "choose" the prison alternative.
D. COMPENSATION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
Actual criminal proceedings in the United States appear to seek a mixture
of deterrence, compensation, and vengeance. I have already indicated
that these goals are somewhat contradictory and cannot generally be
simultaneously achieved; for example, if punishment were by fine,
minimizing the social loss from offenses would be equivalent to compen-
sating "victims" fully, and deterrence or vengeance could only be
partially pursued. Therefore, if the case for fines were accepted, and pun-
ishment by optimal fines became the norm, the traditional approach to
criminal law would have to be significantly modified.
First and foremost, the primary aim of all legal proceedings would
become the same: not punishment or deterrence, but simply the assess-
ment of the "harm" done by defendants. Much of traditional criminal law
would become a branch of the law of torts,53 say "social torts," in which
the public would collectively sue for "public" harm. A "criminal" action
would be defined fundamentally not by the nature of the actionbutby
the inability of a person to compensate for the "harm" that he caused.
Thus an action would be "criminal" precisely because it results in uncom-
pensated "harm" to others. Criminal law would cover all such actions,
while tort law would cover all other (civil) actions.
As a practical example of the fundamental changes that would be
wrought, consider the antitrust field. Inspired in part by the economist's
classic demonstration that monopolies distort the allocation of resources
and reduce economic welfare, the United States has outlawed con-
52. "Violations,"however, can only be punished by prison terms as long as fifteen
days or fines no larger than $250. Since these are maximum punishments, the actual ones
imposed by the courts can, and often are, considerably less. Note, too, that the courts can
punish by imprisonment, by fine, or by both(La,i'sof York, 1965, chap. 1030, Art. 60).
53. "The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law [of torts] is that of
conzpensatiolz for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant's breach of duty" (Harper and
James, 1956, p. 1299).
54. Of course, many traditional criminal actions like murder or rape would still usually
be criminal under this approach too.34 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
spiracies and other constraints of trade. In practice, defendants are often
simply required to cease the objectionable activity, although sometimes
they are also fined, become subject to damage suits, or are jailed.
if compensation were stressed, the main purpose of legal proceedings
would be to levy fines equal tothe harm inflicted on society by con-
straints of trade. There would be no point to cease and desist orders,
imprisonment, ridicule, or dissolution of companies. If the economist's
theory about monopoly is correct, and if optimal fines were levied, firms
would automatically cease any constraints of trade, because the gain to
them would be less than the harm they cause and thus less than the fines
expected. On the other hand, if Schumpeter and other critics are correct,
and certain constraints of trade raise the level of economic welfare,
fines could fully compensate society for the harm done, and yet some
constraints would not cease, because the gain to participants would ex-
ceed the harm to others.56
One unexpected advantage, therefore, from stressing compensation
and fines rather than punishment and deterrence is that the validity of the
classical position need not be judged a priori. If valid, compensating
fines would discourage all constraints of trade and would achieve the
classical aims. If not, such fines would permit the socially desirable
constraints to continue and, at the same time, would compensate society
for the harm done.
Of course, as participants in triple-damage suits are well aware, the
harm done is not easily measured, and serious mistakes would be inevit-
able. However, it is also extremely difficult to measure the harm in many
civil suits,57 yet these continue to function, probably reasonably well on
the whole. Moreover, as experience accumulated, the margin of error
would decline, and rules of thumb would develop. Finally, one must
55. Actually,fines should exceed the harm done if the probability of conviction were
less thanunity. The possibility of avoidingconviction is the intellectual justification for
punitive, such as triple, damages against those convicted.
56.Theclassical view is that D'(M)alwaysis greater than zero, where Mmeasures
the different constraints of trade and D'measuresthe marginal damage; the critic's view is
that for some Al,D'(M) <0. It has been shown above that if D'alwaysis greater than
zero, compensating fines would discourage all offenses, in this case constraints of trade,
while if D'sometimesis less than zero, some offenses would remain (unless the
marginal cost of detecting and convicting offenders, were sufficiently large relative to D').
57. Harper and James said, "Sometimes [compensation] can be accomplished with
a fair degree of accuracy. But obviously it cannot be done in anything but a figurative
and essentially speculative way for many of the consequences of personal injury. Yet it is
the aim of the law to attain at least a rough correspondence between the amount awarded as
damages and the extent of the suffering" (1956, p. 1301).
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realize that difficult judgments are also required by the present antitrust
policy, such as deciding that certain industries are "workably" competi-
tive or that certain mergers reduce competition. An emphasis on fines
and compensation would at least help avoid irrelevant issues by focusing
attention on the information iftost needed for intelligent social policy.
VI. PRIVATE EXPENDITURES AGAINST CRIME
A variety of private as well as public actions also attempt to reduce the
number and incidence of crimes: guards, doormen, and accountants are
employed, locks and alarms installed, insurance coverage extended, parks
and neighborhoods avoided, taxis used in place of walking or subways,
and so on. Table 1lists close to $2 billion of such expenditures in1 965,
and this undoubtedly is a gross underestimate of the total. The need for
private actionisespecially greatinhighly interdependent modern
economies, where frequently a person must trust his resources, including
his person, to the "care" of employees, employers, customers, or sellers.
If each person tries to minimize his expected loss in income from
crimes, optimal private decisions can be easily derived from the previous
discussion of optimal public ones. For each person there is a loss function
similar to that given by equation (18):
+ C)(p), C,+ (3 1)
The termrepresents the harm to jfromthe 0) offenses committed
againstj, while C, represents his cost of achieving a probability of convic-
tion offor offenses committed against him. Note that C2 not only is
positively related to 0,, but also is negatively related to C, public expendi-
tures on crime, and to Ck,theset of private expenditures by other
persons.58
The term measures the expectedloss toj from punishment
of offenders committing any of the 0,,. Whereas most punishments result
in a net loss to society as a whole, they often produce a gain for the actual
victims. For example, punishment by fines given to the actual victims is
just a transfer payment for society but is a clear gain to victims; similarly,
58.An increase in C1, — 0,, and C heldconstant—presumably helpssolve offenses
againstj, because more of those against k would be solved.
59. The expected private loss, unlike the expected social loss, is apt to have con-
siderable variance because of the small number of independent offenses committed against
any single person. 1ff were not risk neutral, therefore, L would have to be modified to in-
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punishment by imprisonment is a net loss to society but is a negligible
loss to victims, since they usually pay a negligible part of imprisonment
costs. This is whyis often less than or equal to zero, at the same time
that b, the coefficient of social loss, is greater than or equal to zero.
Since are determined primarily by public policy on punish-
ments, the main decision variable directly controlled by jisp,. If he
chooses a p,, that minimizes the optimality condition analogous to
equation (22) is
a / 1\60 u'i_ c"c' — 1 lAj T — —
€)Pj
Theelasticity measuresthe effect of a change inon the number of
offenses committed against j.Ifb, < 0, and if the left-hand side of equa-
tion (32), the marginal cost of changingwere greater than zero, then
(32) implies that> 1. Since offenders can substitute among victims,
is probably much larger than E,,, the response of the total number of
offenses to a change in the average probability, p. There is no incon-
sistency, therefore, between a requirement from the optimality condi-
tion given by (22) that ç < I and a requirement from (32) that> 1.
VII. SOME APPLICATIONS
A. OPTIMAL BENEFITS
Our analysis of crime is a generalization of the economist's analysis of
external harm or diseconomies. Analytically, the generalization consists
in introducing costs of apprehension and conviction, which make the
60.1 have assumed that
äCk — = — = 0,
3p,
inother words, that j is too "unimportant" to influence other expenditures. Although
usually reasonable, this does suggest a modification to the optimality conditions given
by eqs. (21) and (22). Since the effects of public expenditures depend on the level of private
ones, and since the public is sufficiently "important" to influence private actions, eq. (!2)
has to be modified to
(22')
and similarly for eq. (21). "The" probability p is, of course, a weighted average of the
p,. Eq. (22') incorporates the presumption that an increase in public expenditures would be
partially thwarted by an induced decrease in private ones.APPROACH GARY S. BECKER 37
Discussions of external economies or advantages are usually per-
fectly symmetrical to those of diseconomies, yet one searches in vain for
analogues to the law of torts and criminality. Generally, compensation
cannot be collected for the external advantages as opposed to harm
caused, and no public officials comparable to policemen and district at-
torneys apprehend and "convict" benefactors rather than offenders. Of
course, there is public interest in benefactors: medals, prizes, titles, and
other privileges have been awarded to military heroes, government
officials, scientists, scholars, artists, and businessmen by public and
private bodies. Among the most famous are Nobel Prizes, Lenin Prizes,
the Congressional Medal of Honor, knighthood, and patent rights. But
these are piecemeal efforts that touch a tiny fraction of the population
and lack the guidance of any body of law that codifies and analyzes dif-
ferent kinds of advantages.
Possibly the explanation for this lacuna is that criminal and tort law
developed at the time when external harm was more common than ad-
vantages, or possibly the latter have been difficult to measure and thus
considered too prone to favoritism. In any case, it is clear that the asym-
metry in the law does not result from any analytical asymmetry, for a
formal analysis of advantages, benefits, and benefactors can be developed
that is quite symmetrical to the analysis of damages, offenses, and offend-
ers. A function A(B), for example, can give the net social advantages
from B benefits in the same way that D(O) gives the net damages from 0
offenses. Likewise, K(B,can give the cost of apprehending and
rewarding benefactors, where Pi is the probability of so doing, with K'
and> 0; B(p1, a, v) can give the supply of benefits, where a is the
award per benefit and v represents other determinants, with aB/ap1 and
äB/3a>0; and b1 can be the fraction of a that is a net loss to society. In-
stead of a loss function showing the decrease in social income from
offenses, there can be a profit function showing the increase in income
from benefits:
II =A(B)—K(B,Pi) —b1p1aB.
If [I is maximized by choosing appropriate values of p1 and a, the
optimality conditions analogous to equations (21) and (22) are
probability of apprehension and conviction an important decision vari-
able, and in treating punishment by imprisonment and other methods as
well as by monetary payments. A crime is apparently not so different
analytically from any other activity that produces external harm and
when crimes are punishable by fines, the analytical differences virtually
vanish.
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areboth greater than zero. The implications of these equations are related
to and yet differ in some important respects from those discussed earlier
for (21) and (22).
For example, if b, > 0, which means that a is not a pure transfer but
costs society resources, clearly (34) and (35) imply that e5> since
both> 0 and ap1/3B > 0. This is analogous to the implication of(21)
and (22) that> e,, but, while the latter implies that, at the margin,
offenders are risk preferrers,theformer implies that, at the margin, bene-
factors are risk avoiders.6' Thus, while the optimal values ofp and f
wouldbe in a region where "crime does not pay"—in the sense that the





(see the discussion on pp. 177—78). By differentiating eq. (2'), one can write (I') as
p,[U(Y+a)— U(Y)] > a), (3')
or
U(Y+a)—U(Y)U'(Y+a). (4')
But (4') holds if everywhere U" <0and does not hold if everywhere U"0, which was to
be proved.GARY S. BECKER 39
marginal income of criminals would be less than that available to them in
less risky legal activities—the optimal values of p1 and a would be where
"benefits do pay"—in the same sense that the marginal income of bene-
factors would exceed that available to them in less risky activities. In
this sense it "pays" to do "good" and does not "pay" to do "bad."
As an illustration of the analysis,.consider the problem of rewarding
inventors for their inventions. The function A(B) gives the total social
value of B inventions, and A' gives the marginal value of an additional
one. The function K(B, Pi) gives the cost of finding and rewarding inven-
tors; if a patent system is used, it measures the cost of a patent office, of
preparing applications, and of the lawyers, judges, and others involved
in patent litigation.62 The elasticities e,,ande0measurethe response of
inventors to changes in the probability and magnitude of awards, while
b1 measures the social cost of the method used to award inventors. With
a patent system, the cost consists in a less extensive use of an invention
than would otherwise occur, and in any monopoly power so created.
Equations (34) and (35) imply that with any system having b1 > 0,
the smaller the elasticities of response of inventors, the smaller should be
the probability and magnitude of awards. (The value of a patent can be
changed, for example, by changing its life.) This shows the relevance of
the controversy between those who maintain that most inventions stem
from a basic desire "to know" and those who maintain that most stem
from the prospects of financial awards, especially today with the emphasis
on systematic investment in research and development. The former
quite consistently usually advocate a weak patent system, while the latter
equally consistently advocate its strengthening.
Even if A', the marginal value of an invention, were "sizable," the
optimal decision would be to abolish property rights in an invention, that
is, to set Pt =0,if b1 and K 63weresufficiently large and/or the elasticities
andeasufficientlysmall. Indeed, practically all arguments to eliminate
or greatly alter the patent system have been based either on its alleged
costliness, large K or b1, or lack of effectiveness, low e,)ore(,(see,for
example, Plant, 1934, or Arrow, 1962).
If a patent system were replaced by a system of cash prizes, the elas-
ticities of response would become irrelevant for the determination of
62. These costs are not entirely trivial: for example, in 1966 the U.S. Patent Office
alone spent $34 million (see Bureau of the Budget, 1967), and much more was probably
spent in preparing applications and in litigation.
63. Presumably one reason patents are not permitted on basic research is the difficulty
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optimal policies, because b1 would then be approximately zero.64 A sys-
tem of prizes would, moreover, have many of the same other advantages
that fines have in punishing offenders (see the discussion in Sec. V). One
significant advantage of a patent system, however, is that it automatically
"meters" A', that is, provides an award that is automatically positively
related to A', while a system of prizes (or of fines and imprisonment) has
to estimate A' (or D') independently and often somewhat arbitrarily.
B. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC POLICY
The anticipation of conviction and punishment reduces the loss from
offenses and thus increases social welfare by discouraging some offenders.
What determines the increase in welfare, that is "effectiveness," of public
efforts to discourage offenses? The model developed in Section III can
be used to answer this question if social welfare is measured by income
and if "effectiveness" is defined as a ratio of the maximum feasible in-
crease in income to the increase if all offenses causing net damages were
abolished by fiat. The maximum feasible increase is achieved by choosing
optimal values of the probability of apprehension and conviction, p,
and the size of punishments, f (assuming that the coefficient of social
loss from punishment, b, is given). 65
Effectivenessso defined can vary between zero and unity and de-
pends essentially on two behavioral relations: the costs of apprehension
and conviction and the elasticities of response of offenses to changes in
p andf. The smaller these costs or the greater these elasticities, the smaller
the cost of achieving any given reduction in offenses and thus the greater
64.The rightside of both (34)and (35) wouldvanish,and the optimalityconditions
would be
and
A' — K' = 0
A' — K' — K,, 0.
(34')
(35')
Since these equations are not satisfied by any finite values of Pi and a, there is a difficulty
in allocating the incentives betweenand a (see the similar discussion for fines in Sec. V).
65. In symbols, effectiveness is defined as
E=D(0,)—[D(O)+ C(13, Ô)+b13JO]
D(0,) — D(02)
where j3,f, and O are optimal values, 0, offenses would occur ifp=f= 0, and 0, is the
value of 0 that minimizes D.
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the effectiveness. The elasticities may well differ considerably among dif-
ferent kinds of offenses. For example, crimes of passion, like murder or
rape, or crimes of youth, like auto theft, are often said to be less respon-
sive to changes in p and f than are more calculating crimes by adults,
like embezzlement, antitrust violation, or bank robbery. The elasticities
estimated by Smigel (1965) and Ehrlich (1967) for seven major felonies
do differ considerably but are not clearly smaller for murder, rape, auto
theft, and assault than for robbery, burglary, and larceny.66
Probably effectiveness differs among offenses more because of dif-
ferences in the costs of apprehension and conviction than in the elas-
ticities of response. An important determinant of these costs, and one
that varies greatly, is the time between commission and detection of an
offense.67 For the earlier an offense is detected, the earlier the police can
be brought in and themore likely that the victim is able personally to
identify the offender. This suggests that effectiveness is greater for rob-
bery than for a related felony like burglary, or for minimum-wage and
fair-employment legislation than for other white-collar legislation like
antitrust and public-utility regulation.68
C. A THEORY OF COLLUSION
The theory developed in this essay can be applied to any effort to pre-
clude certain kinds of behavior, regardless of whether the behavior is
"unlawful." As an example, consider efforts by competing firms to col-
lude in order to obtain monopoly profits. Economists lack a satisfactory
theory of the determinants of price and output policies by firms in an
industry, a theory that could predict under what conditions perfectly
competitive, monopolistic, or various intermediate kinds of behavior
would emerge. One by-product of our approach to crime and punishment
is a theory of collusion that appears to fill a good part of this lacuna.6"
The gain to firms from colluding is positively related to the elasticity
of their marginal cost curves and is inversely related to the elasticity of
66.A theoretical argument that also casts doubt on the assertion that less "calculating"
offenders are less responsive to changes in p andf can be found in Becker (1962).
67. A study of crimes in parts of Los Angeles during January, 1966, found that "more
than half the arrests were made within 8 hours of the crime, and almost two-thirds were
made within the first week" (President's Commission l967e, p. 8).
68. Evidence relating to the effectiveness of actual, which are not necessarily optimal,
penalties for these white-collar crimes can be found in Stigler (1962, 1966), Landes (1966),
and Johnson (1967).
69. Jacob Mincer first suggested this application to me.42 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
their collective demand curve. A firm that violates a collusive arrange-
ment by pricing below or producing more than is specified can be said to
commit an "offense" against the collusion. The resulting harm to the col-
lusion would depend on the number of violations and on the elasticities
of demand and marginal cost curves, since the gain from colluding de-
pends on these elasticities.
If violations could be eliminated without cost, the optimal solution
would obviously be to eliminate all of them and to engage in pure monop-
oly pricing, in general, however, as with other kinds of offenses, there
are two costs of eliminating violations. There is first of all the cost of
discovering violations and of "apprehending" violators. This cost is
greater, the greater the desired probability of detection and the greater
the number of violations. Other things the same, the latter is usually
positively related to the number of firms in an industry, which partly
explains why economists typically relate monopoly power to concentra-
tion. The cost of achieving a given probability of detection also depends
on the number of firms, on the number of customers, on the stability of
customer buying patterns, and on government policies toward collusive
arrangements (see Stigler, 1964).
Second, there is the cost to the collusion of punishing violators. The
most favorable situation is one in which fines could be levied against
violators and collected by the collusion. If fines and other legal recourse
are ruled out, methods like predatory price-cutting or violence have to
be used, and they hurt the collusion as well as violators.
Firms in a collusion are assumed to choose probabilities of detection,
punishments to violators, and prices and outputs that minimize their loss
from violations, which would at the same time maximize their gain from
colluding. Optimal prices and outputs would be closer to the competitive
position the more elastic demand curves were, the greater the number of
sellers and buyers, the less transferable punishments were, and the more
hostile to collusion governments were. Note that misallocation of re-
sources could not be measured simply by the deviation of actual from
competitive outputs but would depend also on the cost of enforcing collu-
sions. Note further, and more importantly, that this theory, unlike most
theories of pricing, provides for continuous variation from purely com-
petitive through intermediate situations to purely monopolistic pricing.
These situations differ primarily because of differences in the "optimal"
number of violations, which in turn are related to differences in the
elasticities, concentrations, legislation, etc., already mentioned.
These ideas appear to be helpful in understanding the relative success
of collusions in illegal industries themselves! Just as firms in legal indus-
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tries have an incentive to collude to raise prices and profits, so too do
firms producing illegal products, such as narcotics, gambling, prostitu-
tion, and abortion. The "syndicate" is an example of a presumably highly
successful collusion that covers several illegal products.7° In a country
like the United States that prohibits collusions, those in illegal industries
would seem to have an advantage, because force and other illegal methods
could be used against violators without the latter having much legal re-
course. On the other hand, in countries like prewar Germany that legal-
ized collusions, those in legal industries would have an advantage, be-
cause violators could often be legally prosecuted. One would predict,
therefore, from this consideration alone, relatively more successful col-
lusions in illegal industries in the United States, and in legal ones in
prewar Germany.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
his essay uses economic analysis to develop optimal public and private
policies to combat illegal behavior. The public's decision variables are
its expenditures on police, Courts, etc., which help determine the proba-
bility (p) that an offense is discovered and the offender apprehended and
convicted, the size of the punishment for those convicted (f), and the
form of the punishment: imprisonment, probation, fine, etc. Optimal
values of these variables can be chosen subject to, among other things,
the constraints imposed by three behavioral relations. One shows the
damages caused by a given number of illegal actions, called offenses (0),
anotherthe cost of achieving a given p, and the third the effect of changes
in p andf on 0.
"Optimal"decisions are interpreted to mean decisions that minimize
the social loss in income from offenses. This loss is the sum of damages,
costs of apprehension and conviction, and costs of carrying out the pun-
ishments imposed, and can be minimized simultaneously with respect to
p, f, and the form of f unless one or more of these variables is Con-
strained by "outside" considerations. The optimality conditions derived
from the minimization have numerous interesting implications thatcan be
illustrated by a few examples.
If carrying out the punishment were costly, as it is with probation,
imprisonment, or parole, the elasticity of response of offenses withre-
spect to a change in p would generally, in equilibrium, have to exceed its
70. An interpretation of the syndicate along these lines is also found in Schilling (1967).SI
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response to a change inf. This implies, if entry into illegal activities can
be explained by the same model of choice that economists use to explain
entry into legal activities, that offenders are (at the margin) "risk pre-
ferrers." Consequently, illegal activities "would not pay" (at the margin)
in the sense that the real income received would be less than what could
be received in less risky legal activities. The conclusion that "crime would
not pay" is an optimality condition and not an implication about the effi-
ciency of the police or courts; indeed, it holds for any level of efficiency,
as long as optimal values of p and! appropriate to each level are chosen.
If costs were the same, the optimal values of both p and f would be
greater, the greater the damage caused by an offense. Therefore, offenses
like murder and rape should be solved more frequently and punished more
severely than milder offenses like auto theft and petty larceny. Evidence
on actual probabilities and punishments in the United States is strongly
consistent with this implication of the optimality analysis.
Fines have several advantages over other punishments: for example,
they conserve resources, compensate society as well as punish offenders,
and simplify the determination of optimal p's and f's. Not surprisingly,
fines are the most common punishment and have grown in importance
over time. Offenders who cannot pay fines have to be punished in other
ways, but the optimality analysis implies that the monetary value to them
of these punishments should generally be less than the fines.
Vengeance, deterrence, safety, rehabilitation, and compensation are
perhaps the most important of the many desiderata proposed throughout
history. Next to these, minimizing the social loss in income may seem
narrow, bland, and even quaint. Unquestionably, the income criterion can
be usefully generalized in several directions, and a few have already been
suggested in the essay. Yet one should not lose sight of the fact that it is
more general and powerful than it may seem and actually includes more
dramatic desiderata as special cases. For example, if punishment were by
an optimal fine, minimizing the loss in income would be equivalent to
compensating "victims" fully and would eliminate the "alarm" that so
worried Bentham; or it would be equivalent to deterring all offenses
causing great damage if the cost of apprehending, convicting, and punish-
ing these offenders were relatively small. Since the same could also be
demonstrated for vengeance or rehabilitation, the moral should be clear:
minimizing the loss in income is actually very general and thus is more
useful thanthese catchy and dramatic but inflexible desiderata.
This essay concentrates almost entirely on determining optimal
policies to combat illegal behavior and pays little attention to actual poli-
cies. The small amoL
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cies. The small amount of evidence on actual policies that I have ex-
amined certainly suggests a positive correspondence with optimal poli-
cies. For example, itis found for seven major felonies in the United
States that more damaging ones are penalized more severely, that the
elasticity of response of offenses to changes in p exceeds the response to
f, and that both are usually less than unity, all as predicted by the opti-
mality analysis. There are, however, some discrepancies too: for example,
the actual tradeoff between imprisonment and fines in different statutes
is frequently less, rather than the predicted more, favorable to those im-
prisoned. Although many more studies of actual policies are needed, they
are seriously hampered on the empirical side by grave limitations in the
quantity and quality of data on offenses, convictions, costs, etc., and on
the analytical side by the absence of a reliable theory of political deci-
sion-making.
Reasonable men will often differ on the amount of damages or bene-
fits caused by different activities. To same, any wage rates set by competi-
tive labor markets are permissible, while to others, rates below a certain
minimum are violations of basic rights; to some, gambling, prostitution,
and even abortion should be freely available to anyone willing to pay the
market price, while to others, gambling is sinful and abortion is murder.
These differences are basic to the development and implementation of
public policy but have been excluded from my inquiry. I assume consen-
sus on damages and benefits and simply try to work out rules for an
optimal implementation of this consensus.
The main contribution of this essay, as I see it, is to demonstrate that
optimal policies to combat illegal behavior are part of an optimal alloca-
tion of resources. Since economics has been developed to handle resource
allocation, an "economic" framework becomes applicable to, and helps
enrich, the analysis of illegal behavior. At the Same time, certain unique
aspects of the latter enrich economic analysis: some punishments, such
as imprisonments, are necessarily nonmonetary and are a cost to society
as well as to offenders; the degree of uncertainty is a decision variable
that enters both the revenue and cost functions; etc.
Lest the reader be repelled by the apparent novelty of an "economic"
framework for illegal behavior, let him recall that two important con-
tributors to criminology during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
Beccaria and Bentham, explicitly applied an economic calculus. Unfor-
tunately, such an approach has lost favor during the last hundred years,
and my efforts can be viewed as a resurrection, modernization, and
thereby I hope improvement, of these much earlier pioneering studies.46 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
Since D'+C'>O a
This Appendix derives the effects of changes in vanous parameters on the E1> ITherefore
optimal values of p andf It is assumed throughout that b> 0 and that equilib- D" + C'1> 0; and /
numoccurs where the loss L.
aDacac ap , , Supposethat D'
ofachangeinaon/c
the analysis could easily be extended to cover negative values of b and of this
marginal cost term. The conclusion in the text (Sec. II) that D" + C" > 0 is
relied on here. I take it to be a reasonable first approximation that the elastici-
ties of 0 with respect to p or fare constant. At several places a sufficient condi- or




is "small" relative to some other terms. This condition is utilized in the form
of a strong assumption that =0,although I cannot claim any supporting
intuitive or other evidence.
The social loss in income from offenses has been defined as In a similar way it
enous variable
LD(O)+C(0,p)+bpf0. (Al)
If b and pwerefixed, the value off that minimized L would be found from the







= 0, Since 1 —< 0, and b
where
—af 0
E1—y Notethat since lIE1 < I
The sufficient condition would be that a2L/af2 > 0; using aLl af =0and E1 is
constant, this condition becomes
=(D"+ C")0,2 + bp(1 —E1)01>0, (A4) If E, is positively re
orAPPROACH GARY S. BECKER 47
(AS)
SinceD' + C' > 0, and b is not less than zero, equation (A3) implies that
us parameters on the E,> 1. Thereforewould be greater than zero, since we are assuming that
> 0 and that equilib- D" + C"> 0; and f, the value of f satisfying (A3), would minimize (locally)
the loss L.
Suppose that D' is positively related to an exogenous variable a. The effect
>0; of a change in a on/can be found by differentiating equation (A3):
'alues of b and of this d/ d/ D,+(D"+C")01—+bp(l thatD" + C"> 0 is da
ation that the elastici-
aces a sufficient condi- or
df—
(A6)
Since>0,<0,and by assumption 0,then
is utilized in the form df—+
>0. (A7) claim any supporting —T
In a similar way it can be shown that, if C' is positively related to an exog- med as
enous variable /3,
(Al) df— —±
widbe found from the ;>0. (A8)





df——b7pf( I — E,)( I
(A9)
Since 1 —<0,and by assumption>0,
df——<0. (AlO)
Note that since lIE, < 1,
g 0and E,is d(pfO)<0. (All) dy
IfEf is positively related to &,then
0, (A4)
df— —=;<0. (A12)48 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
Since the elasticity of 0 with respect to f equals Ifwere constant,
—f i (32p/aOap)wouldbe
O=E' anda value of p satisfy:
The effects of cha
by (A12), a reduction in E1woulcl reducef. already derived for/an
Suppose that p is related to the exogenous variable r.Thenthe effect of a
shift in ron/canbe found from
a! a!







sinceby assumption C,,0 =0.Since 0,, < 0, and (D" + C") > 0,
If E0 is positively•
—C—)+ (—)—
dr + (Al4)
1ff rather than p were fixed, the value of p that minimizes L, J3, could be if C,, were positive!
found from p would equal
(A15)
aslong as 1ff were related to
82L 1 j5 would be given by
+C +C,,0+C,, P PPQ dji—(D"+C")O,,f,(l
+ bf(l — >0.(A16) di
Since=C,,0=0,(A 16) would hold if
(with C,,0 =0),since all
+ bf(1— 0.(A 17) If both p and D" + C" + C,,,,+C,,
Itis suggested in Section II that C,,,, is generally greater than zero. If, as as- 71. If E,, and Er are co
su med, Then
D'+ C' + >0,
OP
equation(A 15) implies that 1 and thus that .and
bf(1— E,,)> o.
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Ifwere constant, a2p/aOap would be negative," and, therefore,
(a2p/aOap)would be positive. Hence, none of the terms of (A 17) are negative,
and a value of p satisfying equation (A 15) would be a local minimum.
The effects of changes in different parameters onare similar to those
already derived forf and can be written without comment:
r. Then the effect of a
dp—= ,>0, (A18) da
dj3—= ,>0, (A19)
and
r(lIOi) (A13) d/3—b-),pf(l —E1)(l/O,,)<0. (A20)




[nimizesL, j5, could be If C,. were positively related to the parameter s,theeffect of a change in son
j5 would equal
(Al5) (A22) .ds
1ffwere related to the exogenous parameter i, the effect of a change in t on
j5 would be given by




(with=0),since all the terms in the numerator are negative.
-E,,)5->0.(A 17) If both p and f were subject to control, L would be minimized by choosing
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optimal values of both variables simultaneously. These would be given by the
solutions to the two first-order conditions, equations (A2) and (A 15), assuming
that certain more general second-order conditions were satisfied. The effects of or
changes in various parameters on these optimal values can be found by differen-
tiating both first-order conditions and incorporating the restrictions of the
second-order conditions.
The values of p andf satisfying (A2) and (A 15), j5 andf, minimize L if It can be shown that
0,Lif> 0, (A24)
and
and, therefore, (A35) i
= (A25) It has now been p
But and L,,= and since both andhave been shown conditions (A2) and (i
tobe greater than zero, (A24) is proved already, and only (A25) remains. By parameters change the
differentiating Lf with respect to p and utilizing the first-order condition that be found from the two
=0,one has
+ C" + bf( 1 —E1)p0]= (A26)
where I equals the term in brackets. Clearly I >0. and
By substitution, (A25) becomes
> (A27)
and (A27) holds ifand areboth greater than I.>Imeans that By Cramer's rule,






Since 1 —< 0,(A29) implies that and the signs of both de
Consider the effect
E1> E,,, (A 30) eterItis apparent th
which necessarily holds given the assumption that b > 0; prove this by combin-
ing the two first-order conditions (A2) and (A 15).> Imeans that
D" + C" + + + bf(1— > D" + C" + bf(1 —E1)p0.(A3 1) and
Since >0,and<0,this necessarily holds if
+ bpf(1 — < bpf(l — Ef). (A32)
since 0, and 0,, < 0, D
By eliminating D' + C' from the first-order conditions (A2) and (A15) and by Similarly, if C' is ci
combining terms, one has
C,p0 — —=0. (A33)
By combining (A32) and (A33), one gets the condition andAPPROACH GARY S. BECKER 51
'ouldbe given by the C,,ppQ,)< Cpp0, (A34)
and (A 15), assuming or
tisfied. The effects of
ibefoundbydifferen- P3Po>
(A35) e restrictions of the =Po ap
It can be shown that minimize L if
(A24)
E0
and, therefore, (A35) is proven.
(A25) It has now been proved that the values of p and! that satisfy the first-order
conditions (A2) and (A 15) do indeed minimize (locally) L. Changes in different have been shown
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